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Publishing Rights As A Solution To The Economic Crisis Of Mainstream Television Media? A Critical Analysis Of The Indonesian Press Council'S Proposal In Facing The Hegemony Of Digital Platforms

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Abstract: The dominance of global digital platforms such as Google, M
and TikTok has triggered an economic crisis within Indonesia's mainst
television industry, as evidenced by a significant decline in advert
revenue and increased audience fragmentation. This study criti
examines the Indonesian Press Council's proposal on Publishing Rights
response to the economic imbalance between traditional media and d
platforms. By employing theoretical frameworks from Political Econor
Communication, Platform Capitalism, and Media Regulation, the rese
evaluates the mechanisms and implementation potential of Publis
Rights in the Indonesian context and draws comparisons with internat
practices in Australia, France, Canada, and South Korea. A qualit
approach is applied through policy analysis and comparative stu
supported by data obtained from policy documents, industry reports, ar
depth interviews. The findings indicate that Publishing Rights hold pro
as an effective policy instrument to rebalance the digital media ecosy
strengthen the resilience of quality journalism, and enhance the barga
power of national media against global tech giants. Nevertheless, substa
implementation challenges remain, particularly resistance from d
conglomerates and the need for regulatory harmonization. The s
recommends strengthening the legal framework through dedi
legislation, establishing a Digital Media Resilience Authority, and ado
a revenue-sharing model based on content production contributio
conclusion, Publishing Rights have the potential to serve as a strategic
for the economic recovery of the television media industry, provided
are supported by an inclusive policy design and rigorous oversight.

Keywords: Publishing Rights, Digital Platforms, Mainstream Televisio
Political Economy of Media

INTRODUCTION

The television industry, once the cornerstone of information and entertainment distribution, is now facing a profound crisis due to the dominance of digital platforms. The era of digitalization has fundamentally transformed the media landscape, creating a structural imbalance between mainstream media and powerful digital platforms (Mediana, 2022). Television, which held a dominant 85% share of the advertising market in 2019, is now confronting an existential threat as advertising budgets migrate to digital platforms (Nabila M, 2020).

The shift in media consumption from traditional to digital has significantly altered the advertising landscape, with tech giants such as Google, Facebook/Meta, and TikTok now capturing the lion's share of advertising expenditures (Napoli, 2019). This phenomenon impacts not only the economic viability of traditional media but also jeopardizes the sustainability of quality journalism and the diversity of local content.

The rise and dominance of digital platforms and Over-The-Top (OTT) services have radically diverted public attention—and more crucially, advertising revenue—away from traditional media toward the digital ecosystem (Nielsen, 2024; eMarketer, 2024). One of the key drivers of this decline is the behavioral shift among consumers, who increasingly rely on digital platforms for content access. According to We Are Social and Hootsuite's *Digital Report 2024*, the average daily time spent by Indonesian internet users on digital platforms rose to 5 hours and 12 minutes in 2024, up from 4 hours and 48 minutes in 2023. Meanwhile, the average time spent watching television dropped to just 2 hours and 10 minutes per day, highlighting a significant behavioral transformation favoring digital media.

In addition to behavioral shifts, the digital transition itself has contributed to the shrinking advertising revenue traditionally absorbed by mainstream television. The full implementation of Analog Switch-Off (ASO) in August 2023 marked a technical transition to digital broadcasting. However, audience size and advertising revenue declined significantly, falling short of the expectations tied to the approximately 80% digital penetration rate (APJII, 2024).

Consequently, the revenue of mainstream television networks has declined sharply. According to Nielsen Indonesia's *Advertising Expenditure (AdEx) 2024* report, digital ad spending in Indonesia grew at an average annual rate of 18–22% between 2020 and 2024. In contrast, television ad spending has stagnated or even experienced real declines. Although television still commands the largest nominal share of ad spending—estimated at IDR 80–85 trillion in 2024—its growth has been minimal or even negative when adjusted for inflation (Nielsen, 2024; SPS, 2024). In terms of its share of total national advertising expenditure, television's dominance has decreased from its early 2000s peak of over 70% to an estimated 45–50% by the end of 2024 (Projection based on Magna Global & eMarketer data, 2024).

Data from the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (*Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia*, KPI) in 2024 also show that national television advertising revenue declined by 45% over the past six years (2018–2024), while the budget allocation for digital platforms surged to 68% in 2024, up from 60% in 2023. Global tech companies such as Google and Meta now control 72% of the global digital advertising market, up from 70% in the previous year.

The Indonesian Private Television Association (*Asosiasi Televisi Swasta Indonesia*, ATVSI) has also reported declining advertising revenues among its member stations over the past three years. From 2021 to 2024, national television ad revenues (gross) declined by approximately 19.92%, varying by station and program segmentation (ATVSI, 2025). The sharpest declines occurred in news and premium entertainment programs due to advertising migration to digital platforms such as YouTube, Instagram, and TikTok (Iskandar, 2025).

Table 1. Decline in National TV Advertising Revenue (2020–2024)

Year	SCMA	MNCN	VIVA	Remarks
2020	–18%	–17%	–15.97%	Initial impact of the COVID-19 pandemic
2021	–2%	–1%	–1%	Early post-pandemic recovery
2022	–9%	–11%	–14.3%	Digital pressure and audience fragmentation
2023	–11.36%	–14%	–28.45%	Significant decline due to digitalization
2024*	–5%	–6%	–7%	Estimated data Q1–Q2, stagnant trend

The data utilized in this study regarding the decline in advertising revenues for national television networks—SCMA, MNCN, and VIVA—were compiled from a combination of published financial statements, industry reports, and estimations derived from expert analyses. For SCMA (PT. Surya Citra Media Tbk), the data sources include the company's consolidated financial statements for Q1 2023 and the full year 2022, accessed through Scribd and SCMA's official Investor Relations platform. Estimates for the years 2020–2021 were drawn from Nielsen data and research conducted by RHB (2023).

In the case of MNCN (PT. Media Nusantara Citra Tbk), relevant information was obtained from the company's annual reports for 2021 and 2022. Additionally, research by CLSA and Media Partners Asia (2023) provided further context on advertising trends, while the estimates for 2020 and 2024 were based on industry trend reports issued by the Indonesian Advertising Association and internal research insights. For VIVA (PT. Visi Media Asia Tbk), the analysis was based on the company's published financial reports from 2020 to 2023. The projection for 2024 was derived from an extrapolation of Q1 revenue data and an evaluation of the broader trend of digital transformation in the television industry. This multi-source triangulation ensures that the data reflect both the quantitative performance metrics and qualitative trend patterns shaping the economic challenges faced by Indonesian mainstream television media.

A significant portion of advertising revenue has shifted toward digital platforms, with tech giants such as Google and Meta dominating over 75% of the rapidly growing digital advertising market (eMarketer, 2024). These platforms monetize user attention—attention that is often generated by traditional media such as television—without providing adequate compensation to the original content producers (Bell, 2024; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [ACCC], 2019).

The rise of digital media has also contributed to declining viewership ratings and audience fragmentation. Research conducted by Kompas Research and Development (2024) reveals a significant drop in average daily television viewing time in urban areas, particularly among the 15–35 age group, who have increasingly migrated to digital and OTT platforms. This fragmentation renders traditional television advertising less attractive to advertisers targeting specific audiences.

Television media remains burdened by high content production costs due to multiple operational cost centers, including journalists, technical crews, equipment, and satellite infrastructure. This stands in stark contrast to the relatively low content costs in the digital realm. The situation worsens when television content is reused on digital platforms. When such content is shared or embedded on digital platforms, the monetization returned to the originating TV stations is often minimal—or nonexistent—while the platforms profit from the ads displayed alongside that content (Picard, 2020).

This near-total dependence on advertising revenue, compounded by digital disruption and rising operational costs, has created a "perfect storm" for the economic stability of Indonesia’s mainstream television media. The resilience of quality television journalism—an essential pillar of democracy—is now under serious threat.

Press Council Proposal: Is Publishing Rights the Solution?

In response to this multidimensional crisis, the Press Council (Dewan Pers)—an independent state institution tasked with safeguarding press freedom and a healthy media ecosystem—has proposed a controversial yet potentially impactful policy solution: the implementation of Publishing Rights (Journalistic Copyrights). This proposal draws inspiration from international practices such as Neighbouring Rights or Related Rights for Press Publications, which have been adopted in various countries to support news media, including broadcast news content (Press Council, 2023).

The Press Council argues that television media, as a critical component of democracy and media diversity in Indonesia, must receive adequate protection and institutional support. In March 2023, the Press Council finalized and submitted a draft Presidential Regulation (Perpres) on Publishing Rights to President Joko Widodo. The President responded by issuing Presidential Regulation No. 32 of 2024 on the Responsibility of Digital Platform Companies to Support Quality Journalism in February 2024 (Setkab, 2024).

Google has publicly stated its willingness to study and consider the provisions of the new regulation (Sinaga, 2024), and several other digital platforms, including Meta, have reportedly shown a cooperative stance toward the proposed policy.

RESEARCH METHOD

This research adopts a qualitative approach, which is deemed most appropriate for exploring the complexities of media policy, industry transformation, and power dynamics within the digital ecosystem. Rather than relying on numerical data alone, this study seeks to understand the deeper structures, motivations, and implications behind the proposed Publishing Rights policy in Indonesia. A qualitative method allows for rich contextual analysis and the integration of multiple perspectives, especially in the context of rapidly evolving digital media landscapes (Creswell & Poth, 2018).

The primary method employed in this study is policy analysis, supported by a comparative case study framework. Policy analysis is used to examine the design, goals, implementation mechanisms, and legal frameworks of Presidential Regulation No. 32/2024, along with documents produced by the Indonesian Press Council. Meanwhile, the comparative case study provides a lens through which the Indonesian experience is evaluated against similar initiatives in countries such as Australia, France, Canada, and South Korea.

To ensure a comprehensive understanding, this study incorporates a variety of data sources. These include official policy documents (e.g., drafts, regulations, legal texts), public statements from relevant stakeholders, industry reports, and existing literature such as academic journals and think tank publications. This triangulation of sources helps enhance the validity of the findings and provides a multidimensional view of the challenges and opportunities surrounding publishing rights. In addition to secondary data, in-depth interviews were conducted with key informants, including representatives from broadcasting media, members of the Press Council, digital policy experts, and media law scholars. These interviews offered critical insights into how the proposed policy is perceived by those directly affected and those involved in shaping its content. The interviews were semi-structured, allowing participants the freedom to elaborate while still aligning with the main themes of the research.

A thematic analysis was conducted on both the documentary and interview data. Key themes identified include revenue asymmetry, legal enforcement capacity, resistance from digital platforms, and institutional readiness. These themes were then interpreted through the theoretical lenses of Political Economy of Communication, Platform Capitalism, and Media Regulation Theory to provide a deeper analysis of structural power relations (Mosco, 2009; Srnicek, 2017; McChesney, 2013). Reliability was ensured by keeping a detailed audit trail throughout the research process. All sources and coding decisions were documented, and key interpretations were cross-validated using peer debriefing and member checking with selected participants. While qualitative research does not aim for statistical generalization, it strives for analytical depth and contextual richness, which this study maintains through careful methodological design.

The comparative aspect of this study is particularly important. Drawing lessons from Australia's News Media Bargaining Code, the EU Copyright Directive, Canada's Bill C-18, and Korea's Telecommunications Business Act provides a broader policy landscape. These cases offer a useful mirror to reflect on Indonesia's readiness and possible pitfalls. The comparison does not seek to rank models but rather to extract best practices and contextual lessons.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The Indonesian mainstream television industry has experienced a significant decline in advertising revenue over recent years. Data indicates that TV ad spending dropped by approximately 34% following the COVID-19 pandemic (KataData, 2020). This decline is not merely temporary but reflects a long-term trend of advertisers shifting budgets toward digital platforms.

Financial reports from major broadcasters such as MNC and EMTK, along with data from Nielsen and PPPI, confirm a persistent downward trajectory (Nyoman, 2022). Between 2021 and 2024, television ad growth stagnated at around 0–2% annually, well below the inflation rate. In contrast, digital advertising has grown at over 15% annually, with television's share of total ad spending projected to fall below 50% by the end of 2024 (Nielsen, 2024).



Figure 1. Annual Advertising Spending Growth

As television advertising revenue declines, digital ad spending in Indonesia has surged significantly. By 2025, digital platforms are projected to control approximately 75% of the country's total advertising expenditure, indicating a fundamental shift in media investment strategies (CampaignIndonesia, 2024). Internet advertising revenue grew by 10.1% in 2023, contributing an additional USD 52.5 billion, and is expected to continue expanding at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 9.5% through 2028 (Nielsen, 2024).



Figure 2. Digital Advertising

This pie chart illustrates the estimated distribution of digital advertising market share among major platforms in Indonesia. Google, including its services such as Search and YouTube, leads the market with a 42% share. Meta platforms—comprising Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp—follow closely with 35%. TikTok accounts for 15% of the market, while other digital platforms like Shopee, Traveloka, and others collectively make up the remaining 8%. The data highlights the significant concentration of advertising revenue among a few dominant global platforms, reflecting the structural power they hold within the Indonesian digital ecosystem.

Table 1. Platform Revenue Breakdown

Platform	**Estimated Revenue (2024)**
Google	IDR 30–32 trillion
Meta	IDR 25–27 trillion
TikTok	IDR 10–12 trillion
Others	IDR 5–6 trillion

The dominance of digital platforms has created a structural imbalance within Indonesia's media ecosystem. Major platforms such as Google, Facebook, and TikTok control not only the distribution of content but also capture the largest share of advertising revenue, despite contributing little to the production of quality journalism.

Audience fragmentation has further weakened traditional media. Data from Kompas R&D (2024) shows a 35% decline in daily TV viewing time among urban viewers aged 15–34 over the past five years, as audiences shift to platforms like YouTube, TikTok, and streaming services. The remaining TV audience is older and less attractive to certain advertisers.

As a result, Indonesian television media faces mounting financial pressure due to changes in consumption patterns and the shift of advertising budgets to digital platforms (Mediana, 2022). Nielsen data shows that TV advertising declined from IDR 143 trillion in 2019 to IDR 125 trillion in 2024, while digital advertising rose from IDR 13.3 trillion to IDR 55.3 trillion (Nabila, 2020). This decline has had a direct impact on the financial performance of broadcasters. PT MDTV Media Technologies Tbk (NET TV) reported a drop in revenue from IDR 81.7 billion in Q1 2024 to IDR 32.6 billion in Q1 2025 (Hasan, 2025). Similarly, Surya Citra Media (SCMA) experienced stagnant revenue of around IDR 1.5 trillion in Q1 2023, a 0.4% year-on-year decline, primarily due to weak Free-to-Air (FTA) ad revenues, which contribute 78% of total income (Hamdi Akmalal, 2023).



Figure 3. Ad Revenue Trends

The chart clearly illustrates a consistent decline in TV advertising revenue. The blue line shows a drop from 60% in 2015 to just 28% in 2024, indicating a shift in audience preference from conventional media to digital platforms, especially among younger and mobile-centric users. Contributing factors include high TV advertising costs, limited audience targeting, and decreasing linear TV viewing time. Conversely, the orange line indicates that digital ad revenue has grown from 20% in 2015 to 65% in 2024. The two lines intersect in 2020, marking the point where digital advertising began to surpass TV ads, with digital dominance fully realized by 2024 at nearly twice the TV ad share.

From an industry insider perspective, Kristof Bagas (2025), GM of Social Media at Emtek Ex, revealed that under the YouTube Partnership Program, TV networks receive 55% of net revenue while YouTube retains 45%. For example, a million views on a TV program uploaded to YouTube may yield approximately IDR 8.25 million for the broadcaster, based on a CPM (Cost Per Mille) of $1.5. If the video is uploaded by a third party, the original TV station earns nothing, unless protected by YouTube's Content ID system. While Content ID helps secure revenue for rightful content owners, it is not foolproof. Some YouTubers bypass detection by altering the video (e.g., adding watermarks or changing audio), which diminishes potential earnings for television broadcasters.

Impact on Journalism Quality

The decline in advertising revenue for television broadcasters has directly affected the quality of journalism. Many stations have been forced to cut newsroom budgets, reduce the number of journalists, and rely on inexpensive, shallow content. As a result, the media's role as a democratic watchdog and provider of reliable information is under serious threat (Pickard, 2020). Layoffs, reduced airtime for news programming, the closure of regional bureaus, and a heavier dependence on infotainment have become common survival strategies.

Press Council's Response: The Proposal for Publishing Rights

The Indonesian Press Council has identified the imbalance of bargaining power between digital platforms and news media as the root of the problem. Platforms such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram often profit from journalistic content without fairly compensating the original producers (Republika, 2022). According to the late Chairman Azyumardi Azra, regulations are needed to compel global platforms to share their advertising revenue with Indonesian media.

The core argument behind this proposal is that digital platforms have built trillion-dollar businesses as content aggregators, while contributing very little to the high cost of content production. Television news content, which attracts large audiences, is widely reused across platforms, yet without proportionate returns to the original producers.

Drawing from the policy models of France and Australia, the Press Council explicitly proposes including television news content—whether broadcast or uploaded on official TV websites and apps—as subject to publishing rights. The proposal is based on the premise that digital platforms derive substantial economic value from such content without providing fair compensation.

The strategic goals of publishing rights include:

a. Rebalancing revenue through equitable sharing between platforms and traditional media.
b. Sustainable journalism by securing funding for quality content production.
c. Fair competition between platforms and legacy media.
d. Democratic media by maintaining media pluralism in the digital ecosystem.

Legal Framework of Presidential Regulation No. 32/2024

On February 20, 2024, President Joko Widodo enacted Presidential Regulation (Perpres) No. 32/2024 on the Responsibility of Digital Platform Companies to Support Quality Journalism (Setkab, 2024). This regulation serves to formally define the obligations of digital platforms in respecting and supporting journalistic content as intellectual property that deserves fair and transparent treatment.

The regulation outlines several key areas: the classification of digital platform companies operating in Indonesia, collaboration with verified media organizations, the establishment of an oversight committee, and funding mechanisms. Importantly, it marks Indonesia's first legal instrument aimed at regulating the relationship between global digital platforms and the local news industry to create a fairer and more sustainable media ecosystem.

Establishment of the Publisher Rights Committee

To implement this policy, the Indonesian Press Council formed the Publisher Rights Committee, consisting of 11 members: five from the press or civil society, five from expert representatives within the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, and one from the Ministry of Communication and Information (Susapto, 2024). The committee is responsible for monitoring compliance, issuing recommendations to the Minister, and supporting arbitration and alternative dispute resolution processes (Digital Policy Alert, 2024). Decisions are made collectively with an emphasis on transparency and independence.

Obligations of Digital Platforms

Under Perpres No. 32/2024, digital platforms are required to support quality journalism through several mechanisms (SSEK Law Firm, 2024), including:

a. Prohibiting the distribution or monetization of news content that violates existing regulations.
b. Supporting the commercialization of content produced by verified news organizations.
c. Ensuring fair treatment of all registered press institutions.
d. Offering training and development programs to promote responsible journalism.
e. Developing algorithmic systems that prioritize the distribution of quality journalism.
f. Cooperating directly with verified news publishers.

This regulatory framework represents a landmark step in Indonesia's digital media governance, aiming to restore fairness in the value chain between content producers and global platforms.

Negotiation and Arbitration Mechanism

Presidential Regulation No. 32/2024 establishes a framework for good faith negotiations and, if necessary, arbitration between digital platforms and media companies, similar to the Australian model (Treasury Australia, 2025). Designation of digital platforms is carried out by the Minister based on the presence of a significant bargaining power imbalance and contribution to journalism sustainability. Platforms are required to engage in three months of negotiations followed by mediation. If a commercial agreement is not reached, registered news organizations may initiate mandatory arbitration to determine fair remuneration.

Based on the Press Council's proposals and international best practices, the suggested mechanism includes:

a. Legal subject: The right holder is a registered news organization (e.g., TV stations) that produces original news content.
b. Scope of rights: Compensation for substantial digital reproduction or public communication of TV news content by digital platforms (news aggregators, search engines, social media).
c. Payment model: A compulsory licensing scheme with value determined through negotiation, based on metrics such as views, clicks, or economic value generated.
d. Regulatory body: Could involve a new independent institution or expanded authority of existing ones, such as KPI or a dedicated body similar to Australia's ACMA.
e. Dispute resolution: Mandatory arbitration using a final offer mechanism to avoid deadlocks due to power asymmetries.
f. Revenue distribution: Ensures fair allocation not only to major broadcasters but also to regional and independent news producers.

The Ministry of Communications and Digital is currently drafting a Government Regulation on Media Content Protection, scheduled for mid-2024, as the legal basis for implementing publishing rights (Komdigi, 2024).

Comparative Study: Australia's Publishing Rights Model

Australia pioneered publishing rights through the News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code (NMBC), effective since 2021 (Australian Government, 2021; Wikipedia, 2021). This law compels tech giants like Google and Meta to negotiate payments with Australian news outlets for use of their content. The NMBC empowers the Australian Treasury to designate digital platforms if they fail to reach voluntary agreements. Google complied preemptively, while Meta initially blocked news content in Australia but eventually negotiated after facing designation threats (Meese et al., 2022). As a result, over 30 commercial agreements have been signed, estimated to generate more than AU$200 million annually for the Australian media industry. Google agreed to pay around AU$150 million to over 70 outlets, including News Corp and ABC, while Meta committed approximately AU$70 million to 13 major publishers (Meese et al., 2022). Though mandatory arbitration has yet to be invoked, it remains a powerful deterrent (ACMA, 2023; Fletcher, 2021). This model offers a strong reference for Indonesia's efforts in restoring fairness and sustainability in its media ecosystem through the implementation of publishing rights.

How Revenue Is Distributed to Mainstream Media
Australian Model (ACCC, 2021)

a. Direct Individual Contracts
Tech giants like Google and Meta sign paid licensing agreements directly with major media groups such as Nine Entertainment, News Corp Australia, Guardian Australia, and ABC.
b. Example: Google pays Nine for Sydney Morning Herald content; Meta pays News Corp for The Australian.
c. Funding Pool for Small Media
A portion of funds is distributed to regional and local media through collective agreements.
d. Example: Google partnered with Country Press Australia (representing 160+ local newspapers) with a fund worth AU$15 million annually.
e. Google also offers grants through the Google News Showcase to small outlets like Neos Kosmos for training and business support.

However, the lack of transparency around these deals sparked concern that funds may not reach newsrooms. Meta also protested by briefly blocking news in Australia before complying after code adjustments (Meese, 2022).

European Union Model: EU Copyright Directive (2019)

The EU Copyright Directive 2019/790 mandates platforms like Google and Meta to sign licensing deals with content creators, including journalists and publishers (European Union, 2019).

1. **Neighbouring Rights for News Publishers**
Platforms must compensate publishers for displaying news snippets longer than short excerpts.
   a. Result: Google signed paid licensing deals with hundreds of French publishers (AFP, Le Monde, etc.) via Google News Showcase.

b. Meta initially resisted and blocked news in France but later complied under negotiation.

2. **Compensation for Content Use**
   Platforms like YouTube must ensure uploaded content respects copyright and share ad revenue with rights holders.
   a. Example: YouTube's Content ID system detects copyrighted material; ad revenue is shared with rights holders (e.g., TV broadcasters like Canal+).
   b. YouTube reportedly distributes €2 billion/year to European rights holders (The Verge, 2018).

Revenue Distribution Methods:

a. Direct Licensing (Article 15) – Platforms pay mainstream publishers (e.g., Le Monde) directly.
b. Collective Management – Platforms pay to collective organizations (e.g., APIG), which distribute funds to smaller publishers.
c. Revenue Sharing via Content ID – Ad revenue from user uploads is split proportionally with registered media rights holders.

Google and Meta ultimately signed contracts with major media groups (including France Télévisions), ensuring multimillion-euro revenue flows. Agencies like AFP also benefit significantly (European Commission, 2022). Criticisms: The French "neighbouring rights" model is criticized for lack of transparency. Small publishers struggle to access meaningful compensation. Meta even stopped showing news in France to avoid payments (Nielsen & Ganter, 2022; Myllylahti, 2020).



Figure 4. Limitations of the French Model (Neighbouring Rights)

The diagram highlights the vulnerability of negotiation models without mandatory arbitration. While this implementation has created a new revenue stream for media outlets, issues of fairness and transparency remain critical and require strict oversight by regulators such as Autorité de la Concurrence in France. In 2021, the authority fined Google €500 million for failing to negotiate in good faith with smaller media groups like APIG (Autorité de la Concurrence, 2021, July 13). When compared to France's publishing rights approach, the Australian model appears more successful, offering higher compensation and stronger support for mainstream media through mandatory arbitration mechanisms.



Figure 5. Publishing Rights

Canadian Model: Bill C-18

Bill C-18, passed in June 2023, mandates digital platforms such as Google and Meta to compensate Canadian news outlets for using their content. The law aims to establish a level playing field between platforms profiting from news-based ads and media organizations that create the content.

Bill C-18 applies to platforms with over CA$1 billion in global annual revenue and more than 20 million monthly active users in Canada. It covers content like news links, snippets, and videos. The law requires fair negotiations between platforms and Canadian media, with a mandatory final-offer arbitration mechanism if talks fail.

As a result, Google agreed to pay CA$100 million annually through Google News Showcase, while Meta opted out and blocked all news content on its platforms in Canada starting August 2023. The expected total benefit from Google is about CA$172 million/year. Funds are distributed to major media groups such as Bell Media (CTV News), CBC/Radio-Canada, Torstar (Toronto Star), and Postmedia (National Post). Smaller outlets receive funding via media associations like News Media Canada and government programs like the Local Journalism Initiative. Allocation is based 75% on the number of full-time journalists and 25% on digital audience reach.

South Korean Model: Telecommunication Business Act

Unlike Australia or France, South Korea does not have a direct "publishing rights" law. Instead, it applies multiple frameworks, including the Copyright Act (protecting reproduction and digital use rights) and the Press Arbitration Act, which governs relationships between news publishers and digital platforms.

The Telecommunication Business Act (정보통신망 이용촉진 및 정보보호 등에 관한 법률) requires major platforms (Google, Meta, Naver, Kakao) to ensure algorithm transparency and accountability for harmful or illegal content. Platforms must declare if they prioritize their own content, and they may be sanctioned for unfair practices.

Although there is no mandatory payment law, platforms like Naver and Kakao voluntarily pay about KRW 30 billion/year to news publishers, such as Chosun Ilbo and JoongAng Ilbo, via licensing programs like "Naver News Partnership." In 2021, the Korea Fair Trade Commission fined Google KRW 67 billion for anti-competitive behavior related to OS restrictions. As of 2024, a proposed amendment to the Press Arbitration Act seeks to require mandatory payments to publishers and stricter sanctions for unfair practices, aligning Korea closer to the Australian and Canadian models. Korean platforms support dialogue, while Google and Meta oppose the amendment.

Lessons for Indonesia

Drawing from international experiences, several key success factors for implementing publishing rights include (Bustami, 2024):

a. Designing policies that avoid content blocking threats by providing proper safeguards.
b. Flexible negotiation frameworks with arbitration as a last resort.
c. Emphasis on revenue sharing rather than one-time compensation.

d. Mechanisms to prevent discriminatory treatment by platforms.
e. Strong political support for publishing rights implementation.
f. Capacity building for mainstream media institutions.

A critical element is strengthening the Publisher Rights Committee (Australia Council for the Arts, 2025), which should consist of experts in digital technology, media law, and industrial economics. The committee should develop standard operating procedures (SOPs) for mediation, oversight, and arbitration. It must also establish a digital monitoring system to track platform compliance.
An effective monitoring system must include (Digital Policy Alert, 2024):
a. An integrated database of registered press companies and protected content.
b. Content tracking systems for platform usage.
c. Public reporting mechanisms for non-compliance.
d. A transparency dashboard showing data on revenue sharing and compliance.

Proposal for Revenue Sharing Model Development
A fair and transparent revenue sharing model should consider:
a. The proportion of platform traffic driven by news content.
b. The commercial value of news based on engagement and reach.
c. Media investments in content production, especially investigative journalism.
d. The platform's role in distributing and amplifying content.

Political Economy Analysis: Power Relations in the Digital Media Ecosystem
According to Vincent Mosco's political economy theory, digital platforms commodify news content to extract economic value (Mosco, 2009), through:
a. Content commodification: transforming news into tradeable commodities.
b. Audience commodification: selling reader data and attention to advertisers.
c. Labor commodification: treating journalists and creators as input for algorithm-driven systems.

This leads to structural imbalance in the media value chain, where platforms dominate profitable distribution and monetization, while traditional media remain stuck in resource-intensive content production with low margins (Fuchs, 2014; Mansell, 2012). Such imbalance creates dependency, traditional media rely on platforms for reach, while platforms can unilaterally change algorithms to the media's detriment (Widya, 2024). Gramsci's concept of hegemony in the digital context reveals how platforms assert dominance not just economically, but ideologically, through notions like "free access" and "information democratization" (Media Theory, 2024).

Publishing rights represent a form of resistance and counter-hegemony, aiming to restore power balance and fair value distribution within the media ecosystem (Journalism University, 2025). However, the effectiveness of this resistance depends on the state's ability to enforce regulations and challenge the transnational structural power of platforms. The experiences of Australia and the EU demonstrate that organized, politically supported resistance can shift power dynamics (The Straits Times, 2019).

CONCLUSION
The global experiences surrounding publishing rights highlight the urgent need for regulatory frameworks that ensure fairness, transparency, and sustainability within the digital media ecosystem. Countries such as Australia, Canada, France, and South Korea offer diverse models of engagement, negotiation, and enforcement. Among these, the most effective approaches prioritize structured arbitration mechanisms, equitable revenue sharing, and institutional support for journalism. For Indonesia, the lessons are clear: a successful publishing rights policy must be rooted in legal safeguards, balanced negotiation platforms, and robust digital monitoring systems. The formation of a credible and competent Publisher Rights Committee is essential to ensure compliance, address disputes, and protect smaller media organizations from exclusion.

Furthermore, digital platforms must be held accountable not only for financial compensation but also for their role in shaping public access to quality information. The political economy perspective reinforces how structural imbalances between platform owners and content producers undermine journalistic independence. Therefore, implementing publishing rights is not only a matter of economic justice but also a critical step toward protecting democratic values and media pluralism. With firm political will, stakeholder engagement, and adaptive regulatory tools, Indonesia has the opportunity to design a fairer and more inclusive media future.

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